Abstract. This paper evaluates the impact of a recent Norwegian familypolicy reform. The reform provides benefits of up to NOK 3,000 (approximately e 400) per month to families with one-to three-year-old children, who do not utilize state-subsidized day-care centres. We investigate the reform's effect on parents' labour force participation. We find that, on average, the reform reduced women's labour force participation and increased the specialization of work between couples. We find that the effect of the reform depends on women's schooling. Specifically, the labour force participation of highly educated mothers fell by more than that of mothers with less education.
1973; Leibowitz and Klerman 1995; Nakamura and Nakamura 1994) , which reduces their labour-market activity. Female labour force participation rates in Scandinavia are the highest among the developed nations (see Table A in the Appendix). In Norway, in 1997, the labour force participation rate of married and cohabiting mothers was 75% if the youngest child was less than three years old, and 83% if the child was from three to six years old (Statistics Norway 1998) . Empirical studies in Scandinavia and in other Western countries suggest that high-quality public child care encourages labour-market activity by women with pre-school children (see, for instance, Anderson and Levine 2000; Gustafsson and Stafford 1992; Hofferth 1999; Hofferth and Collins 2000; Jenkins and Symons 2001; Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000; Lundholm and Ohlsson 1998; Kravdal 1996 ; Van and Siegers 1996) . Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) argue that owing to the income-tax wedge between home production and market work, too little market work is provided. They claim that public provision of day care that stimulates female labour force participation may improve the performance of the economy as a whole. Duncan and Giles (1996) also discuss several efficiency-based arguments for subsidizing care. However, they assert that the strongest arguments are based on distributional concerns. They argue that child-care subsidies may minimize employment gaps for those with child-care responsibilities relative to those without, and could substantially improve women's relative economic status by providing them with income that is not dependent on their spouse.
In the spring of 1998, the Norwegian government decided to introduce cash benefits of up to NOK 3,000 (approximately e 400) per month to those parents with one-to three-year-old children who did not utilize state-subsidized day-care facilities. This amount is roughly equivalent to the state subsidy per child given to day-care centres. Parents who utilize some, but not all, day-care facilities are entitled to receive a proportionally lower cash benefit (see Table B in the Appendix). The cash benefits are neither taxable nor tested against the parents' labour-market participation or income. It is therefore quite possible for both parents to work while receiving benefits. Nonetheless, these benefits increase the costs of child-care centres for parents. The empirical literature suggests that high child-care costs have a negative effect on married women's labour force participation (see for instance, Blau and Robins 1988; Chiuri 2000; Klerman and Leibowitz 1990; Leibowitz et al. 1992; Powell 1997; Ribar 1992) . Thus, the cash benefit reform may reduce parents' -especially mothers' -labour force participation in Norway. Evaluating the effect of the reform on parents' working behaviour is the main objective of this paper. Two dimensions of parents' working behaviour are evaluated: specialization and total market intensity. Lundberg and Rose (1999) define market intensity as the sum of the working hours of a couple, and define specialization as the husband's working hours minus the wife's working hours. We use these definitions in this paper.
The literature on household economics suggests that a large part of the surplus in a marriage is generated by specialization. If one spouse has a comparative advantage in the provision of home-time to commodity production, while the other has a comparative advantage in earning the income that is used to purchase market inputs, then family utility will be maximized by specialization in the time allocation of the couple (see Becker 1973 Becker , 1985 Weiss 1997) . There is ample evidence for specialization within the household. Married men work longer hours in the labour market and have substantially higher wages than single men. Married women have lower wages and work more at home than unmarried women (see Gronau 1986; Daniel 1992; Korenman and Neumark 1992) . Owing to both social and biological factors, many women have a comparative advantage in the production and care of children (see Becker 1991; Lundberg and Rose 1999) . We therefore suggest that the cash benefit reform particularly increases the value of mothers' time at home. Whether it follows from this that specialization increases in households, is an empirical question that is addressed in this paper. Lundberg and Rose (1999) emphasize that child-care costs also affect parents' total market intensity. They find that in the United States, specialization increases and the total market intensity of parents decreases following the birth of a child. This motivates us to evaluate the effect of the cash benefit reform on Norwegian couples' total market intensity.
The impact of cash benefits on specialization and market intensity may differ between groups of individuals according to their characteristics. Becker describes human capital as an important determinant of specialization in households. Human capital analysis assumes that schooling raises earnings and productivity in the market sector, which establishes a positive association between females' education and their labour force participation. This in turn leads to a lower level of specialization between couples in which wives have more schooling relative to couples in which wives have less schooling. As mothers' schooling is one of the important determinants of specialization and of parents' total market intensity, we investigate whether the effect of the reform depends on mothers' schooling. Nilsen et al. (2000) find that women with more education, experience, and income are significantly less likely to quit jobs in Norway. We investigate whether women with a higher level of schooling were less motivated to reduce their hours of paid work relative to those with a lower level of schooling, following the cash benefit reform.
A number of empirical studies in Norway have compared women's labour force participation before and after the cash-benefit reform of 1998. Hellevik (2000) and Rønsen (2001) report that mothers shifted from full-time work to part-time work following the introduction of cash benefits. Langset et al. (2000) estimate that the labour supply of working women was reduced most in the health sector. These studies use cross-section data for women before and after the reform. Langset et al. (2000) and Hellevik (2000) use only descriptive-statistic techniques, while Rønsen (2001) runs multinomial regressions on the following five alternatives: full-time work/subsidized care; full-time work/non-subsidized care; part-time work/subsidized care; part-time work/non-subsidized care; not working. A shortcoming of these studies is that they discuss the labour force participation of the women who receive the cash benefits without considering the problem of sample selection bias. In the econometric literature, a wide range of non-experimental estimators has been proposed to evaluate the unbiased effects of social programs (see Heckman and Robb 1985; Moffitt 1991; Heckman et al. 1999) . This paper addresses the selection-bias problem and evaluates the reform using a difference in difference estimator.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews Norwegian public policies directed towards families with children. Section 3 reports the data sources and explains our sample. Section 4 specifies the econometric model used to evaluate the effect of the reform. Section 5 discusses the effect of the cash-benefit reform on specialization and the total market intensity of couples. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Family policies and transfers to parents
An important feature of Scandinavian welfare states is the transfer of resources to families with children. Other than enhancing equal opportunities for children, the aim of these policies have had been to promote female labour force participation (see Risa 1998) . This section briefly reviews Norwegian transfer policies directed towards families.
Maternity leave
Since 1993, working parents have been entitled to receive 52 weeks leave with 80% wage compensation, or 42 weeks leave with 100% wage compensation, in connection with childbirth. The leave is funded by the state. The mother must take nine weeks leave, three weeks before birth and six weeks after delivery, while the father must take four weeks leave or forfeit it. Parents can share the remaining time for paid parental leave however they wish. If the female is not attached to the labour market, neither spouse can claim paid leave, and the family receives a fixed amount of NOK 32,138 (approximately e 4,000).
Child allowance
All residents in Norway with children under 16 years of age receive an allowance of about NOK 900 (approximately e 115) per child per month. This allowance is neither taxable nor means tested.
Taxation of families
Working couples are taxed independently in Norway. This tax system provides strong incentives for female labour-market participation given that tax brackets are quite progressive.
Single parents
Single parents can get transfers for living expenses until their children reach the age of eight. During the first three years of the child's life, transfers are paid with earnings restrictions, but no further restrictions apply. If transfers commence after the child's third birthday, the single parent must be available for employment suggested by the labour-market authorities, or be enrolled in formal education that may enhance future employment opportunities. The period of entitlement to lone-parenthood transfers may be increased by two years if necessary for the completion of formal education.
Subsidized day care
The costs of public and private day-care centres are shared by the state, the municipalities, and the parents. Parental payments for day care vary according to local rules and may be means tested. Knudsen (1998) estimated cost-sharing arrangements in day-care centres for 1998. The average cost of full-time public day care was NOK 11,500 (approximately e 1,400) per month per child for one-to three-year-olds and NOK 6,700 (approximately e 800) per month for three-to six-year-olds. The costs were slightly lower in private day care. Average parental payments without means-tested reductions were NOK 3,600 (approximately e 450) per month for all age groups.
The main reason for introducing the cash-benefit reform in 1998 was to offer an alternative to subsidized day-care to parents by giving them freedom of choice in child rearing. The cash-benefit reform is quite innovative internationally. It was first introduced in Finland in 1985. The Finnish and Norwegian reforms are quite similar. The main component of both programs is a flat-rate basic payment, but the Finnish system also has a means-tested component and a siblings supplement. Unlike in Finland, the cash benefits in Norway are not taxable.
Data and sample
The sources of our data are living-standard surveys conducted in April-May 1998 and 1999. The 1998 survey was carried out six months before the introduction of the cash-benefit reforms, and includes 2,436 households. The 1999 survey was conducted six months after the reform and includes those mothers in 1998 who still had a pre-school child as well as new mothers who had given birth to a child between the surveys. The sample in 1999 included 3,334 households.
Missing variables reduce our data to 98% and 96% of the households included in the surveys of 1998 and 1999 respectively. In the 1998 survey, 7% of respondents are single parents, 30% are cohabitants, and 63% are in married couples. In the 1999 survey, 9% are single parents, 30% are cohabitants, and 61% are in married couples. We exclude the single parents, but include cohabitants.
1 We also exclude women without a child and those with children that are less than one year old.
Our final sample comprises 1,797 and 2, 741 households from the surveys of 1998 and 1999 respectively. We define parents with a child aged from one to three, and parents with a child aged from three to six, as non-participants.
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Using the surveys of 1998 and 1999, we form a pseudo panel of the two groups. A genuine panel tracks the same individuals over time, whereas a pseudo panel tracks cohorts/groups over time. A cohort/group in a pseudo panel may very well comprise different sets of individuals in each period. In a pseudo panel, estimators are based on cohort/group means rather than on individual observations. Moreover, measurement error varies over time in a pseudo panel because it is averaged over a different number of individuals at different points in time. To minimize measurement-error variance, the individuals in each cohort/group should be as homogenous as possible (see Deaton 1985 for details of pseudo panels). To get groups that are as homogeneous as possible, we define all parents with a child aged from one to three included the 1999 survey (whether they choose to receive the cash benefits or not) as participants. We do so because we cannot identify those parents with a child aged from one to three who are included in the survey of 1998 survey and who would choose not to receive cash benefits were they given the opportunity.
The total number of observations in our sample is 4,538, of which 2,712 are for couples with children aged from one to three. The rest are for couples with children aged from three to six. Some descriptive statistics for these two groups are given in Table 1 . Table 1 shows that specialization between parents increases, and households' total market intensity decreases, following the reform for participants, whereas for non-participants, specialization between parents decreases, and households' total market intensity increases. It is quite likely that the direction of change in specialization and market intensity would have been the same for participants and non-participants had the reform of 1998 not been introduced. Thus, we use the difference in difference estimator, which is explained in the next section, to evaluate the effects of the reforms. Table 1 also illustrates that wives with a university education have higher working hours than women without a university education. Consequently, total market intensity is higher and specialization is lower for wives with a university education.
In almost 8% of the households in our sample, wives work more hours than their husbands. We define one of our dependent variables, specialization, as the difference between the husband's working hours and the wife's working hours. This is negative if the wife's working hours are higher than her husband's, and therefore may result in underestimation of the level of specialization. Thus, we also run regressions that exclude couples in which the wife's working hours are higher than her husband's. Since these regressions do not change our results much, they are not reported.
Econometric specification
We are interested in evaluating the impact of the cash-benefit reform of 1998 on the specialization and total market intensity of Norwegian households. For this purpose, we use a difference in difference estimator, which is defined and specified in this section. Let Y be the outcome variables, specialization and market intensity, and consider the following definitions:
Ã ¼ level of outcome variable for couple i who have a one-to three-yearold child at time t if the cash-benefit reform had not been introduced;
Y it ÃÃ ¼ level of outcome variable for couple i who have a one-to threeyear-old child at time t after the cash-benefit reform was introduced.
The difference between these two outcomes is the effect of the reform, denoted by a:
Our aim is to obtain an estimator of a, the effect of the reform. The difficulty is that we cannot observe Y it Ã directly for couples with a one-to three-year-old child because cash benefits have already been introduced. However, we know the value of Y it Ã for non-participants. In our sample, parents with a child aged from three to six are defined as non-participants. Hence, the estimator of the reform's effect can be obtained by estimating the difference between Y it ÃÃ and Y it Ã for participants and non-participants, respectively. This estimator is: Education is a categorical variable from 1 to 4. 1 is below high school, 2 is college education, 3 is bachelors and 4 is masters degree. In the paper we define levels 1 and 2 as lower than university education and levels 3 and 4 as university education. However, the estimator defined in (2) is likely to be biased because:
Even if the cash benefits had not been introduced, the level of outcome variable for parents with a child aged from one to three would probably differ from that of parents with a child aged from three to six. This is mainly because parents' labour force participation may vary with the age of their children. We can solve this potential selection-bias problem by using the cohort data from the pre-reform to the post-reform period. The following difference in difference estimator can then be used to estimate the effect of the reform:
where
is the change in Y between the pre-reform and postreform periods for participants, and "
The estimator in (4) requires that the change for participants and nonparticipants between the pre-reform and post-reform periods would have been the same in the absence of the reform, that is:
where t-1 is the pre-reform period and t is the post-reform period.
To calculateâ, we estimate the following equation:
where d 1 ¼ 1 if parents have a child aged from one to three, d 1 =0 if parents have a child aged from three to six, d 2 ¼ 1 if the time period is after the reform, and d 2 ¼ 0 if the time period is before the reform. Substituting (6) into (4) yields:
To determine whether the effect of the cash-benefit reform depends on the education level of women, we estimate the following equation:
where x ¼ 1 if the education level is high and x ¼ 0 if the education level is low. The estimator of the effect of the reform for highly educated women is equal to b 3 þ c 3 .
An alternative estimation method is to stratify the whole sample with respect to women's education levels and then estimate Eq. (6) for each stratified sample. We run regressions by stratifying our sample in addition to estimating Eq. (8) but get the same results. Although the standard errors are different, they do not change the significance of the coefficients (so the results are not reported).
To control for other variables, we interact each variable with the same variables with which we interact the education-level variable and estimate the following equation:
where y is the vector of control variables.
Results and discussion
The main objective of our research is to evaluate the impact of the reform of 1998 on the specialization and market intensity of Norwegian couples. For this purpose, we estimate Eq. (6) for each outcome. Table 2 reports the postreform effects of the cash-benefit reform.
We suggested in Sect. 1 that the reform of 1998 may have increased specialization among working parents. Our results confirm this suggestion for our sample. We find that after the cash-benefit reform, couples with children aged from one to three increased their specialization by 3.28 hours and reduced their market intensity by 2.42 hours per week.
Our definitions of specialization and total market intensity are based on the working hours of husbands and wives. Therefore, it is worth noting changes in individuals' working hours following the reform. Table 2 illustrates that wives did less paid work and husbands did more following the reform. The increase in husbands' paid work is insignificant. We find that 87% of the increased specialization and 85% of the decrease in the total market intensity of couples is due to the reduction in working hours by women. Our results are in line with the findings of Rønsen (2001) and Hellevik (2000) that Norwegian women did less paid work following the cash-benefit reforms.
The impact of any social program may differ between groups of individuals according to their characteristics. Here, we examine the impact of mothers' schooling on the effects of the reform.
Household economic models predict a positive association between females' education and their paid work, which leads to a lower level of specialization between couples. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
The impact of cash-benefit reform on parents' labour force participationeducation and average working hours for the women in our sample who have one-to three-year-old children. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the wife's level of education and the level of specialization for couples with one-to three-year-old children. As expected, there is a positive relationship between a woman's education level and her labour force participation, and a negative relationship between a woman's education level and the couples' specialization in the pre-reform and post-reform periods. Nevertheless, average working hours for highly educated women are lower and the level of specialization is higher in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.
To determine whether the effect on specialization and total market intensity of the cash-benefit reform depends on the education level of women, we ran regressions that interact our independent variables with dummies for mothers' education. The results are reported in Table 3 . Education is a categorical variable from 1 to 4. 1 is below high school, 2 is college education, 3 is bachelors and 4 is masters degree. In the paper we define levels 1 and 2 as lower than university education and levels 3 and 4 as university education Fig 2. Education is a categorical variable from 1 to 4: 1 denotes below high school, 2 denotes college education, 3 denotes bachelors degree, and 4 denotes masters degree In this paper, we characterize 1 and 2 as below university-level education and levels 3 and 4 as university-level education Table 3 . Difference in the effect of cash benefits with respect to wife's education level We find that the reform affects households in which the wife lacks a university education as well as households in which the wife has more schooling. The difference between the reform's effects for the two types of household are statistically insignificant, but the reform's effect is larger if the wife has a university education. Households in which the wife does not have a university education specialized by 2.43 hours more following the reform, whereas those in which the wife was university educated specialized by 5.06 hours more. The decrease in the total market intensity of couples is lower, but not significantly, if the wife does not have a university education, whereas total market intensity falls by 3.49 hours per week in households in which the wife has a higher level of schooling. Table 3 reports changes in individuals' working hours for the two groups of women. Changes in specialization and market intensity are largely explained by lower working hours by women, since the changes in husbands' working hours are insignificant for both groups. Women without a university education do 2.17 hours less paid work, whereas the corresponding reduction for university-educated women is 4.28 hours. Controlling for age, industry, number of children, and the husband's education does not change the basic pattern of the results, though we get larger coefficients for the outcome varialbes. All control variables are statistically insignificant. F-tests show that the control variables are also jointly insignificant (results not shown).
A greater effect of the reform in households in which the wife has a university education relative to households in which the wife has less schooling requires explanation. We suggest that one of the reasons why the effect of the reform differs for more-and less-educated wives is a difference in their respective use of child-care facilities. The use of subsidized day care is more common among higher-educated mothers (see Hellevik and Koren 2000) . It is quite likely that less-educated working women who were not using subsidized day care before the reform made other arrangements (such as using husbands, relatives or private nannies to take care of the children during working hours). Since the cash-benefit reform did not raise the price of non-subsidized child care, it would have had a smaller effect on the labour force participation of less-educated mothers' than on that of highly educated mothers.
Comparing with findings from Finland suggests that favourable and flexible labour-market conditions might be important in explaining the effects of cash benefits on less-and higher-educated women in Norway. The unemployment rate in Norway is around 3%, whereas in Finland it was below 3% in the late 1980s, rose sharply in the 1990s and is currently above 9% (OECD 2002; Statistics Finland 2002) . Studies on Finnish data suggest that the education level of mothers did not affect the choice to receive cash benefits during the late 1980s, but during the 1990s, mothers who kept their jobs, who were often highly educated, were much less likely to use child-care cash benefits in Finland (see Rissanen and Knudsen 2001) . These findings from Finland suggest that the low rate of unemployment in Norway may explain why the cash-benefit reform affected households in which the wife did not have a university education as well as households in which the wife had a higher level of education.
Conclusion
The main aim of this research has been to evaluate the effect of the recent cashbenefit reform on the specialization and individual working-hours of Norwegian couples. We found that, on average, women did less paid work following the reform. This led to an increase in specialization between husbands and wives, and a decrease in market intensity in households. Husbands' working hours did not increase significantly. These findings suggest that the cash-benefit reform clearly departs from the strand of Norwegian family policies, which increase women's labour-market participation.
Another objective of this paper was to determine whether the effect of cash benefits depended on the mother's education. We found that women with a low or high level of education reduced their working hours following the reform, which led to an increase in specialization between husbands and wives, and we found that this effect was stronger for highly educated mothers.
We found that the cash-benefit reform reduced paid work by women, particularly by highly educated women. This reduction may have led to efficiency losses of the kind described by Blomquist and Christiansen (1995) and Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) mentioned earlier. However, a full analysis of the efficiency and distributional effects of the cash-benefit reform requires a richer data set than the one used in this paper. Endnotes 1 Cohabitants with one or more children probably behave like married couples and are also treated as married couples as far as public policies are concerned. Running separate regressions for cohabitants and married couples gave us the same results 2 Children aged from one to three are between 12 and 35 months old, whereas children aged from three to six are between 36 and 71 months old.
